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Analysis of choice inconsistencies in on-line choice experiments: impact on welfare 
measures 
Abstract 
Individuals answering to choice experiments are assumed to behave in concordance with standard 
utility theory. However, empirical evidence finds that these assumptions are frequently violated, 
impacting on willingness to pay estimates. Because the cost attribute plays a key role in choice 
experiments used for environmental valuation, this study focuses on the impact of inconsistent 
choices with respect to cost on willingness to pay, drawing on data from a survey aimed at valuing the 
environmental and social impacts of organic farming in mountainous olive orchards. An iterative 
process is used to identify inconsistent choices. Results provide sufficient evidence to suggest that 
inconsistencies can considerably bias willingness to pay estimates. We propose that identifying and 
considering inconsistent choices enhances realism and accuracy of the conclusions drawn from choice 
experiments in environmental valuation. 
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1. Introduction 
Choice Experiments (CEs) have become a popular tool to provide guidance to policy makers about 
the value of environmental goods and services (Birol and Koundori, 2008; Bennett, 2011). In CEs, 
respondents are asked to choose the preferred alternative from a choice set, which typically contains 
between two and five alternatives. It is increasingly recognised that respondents to CE surveys 
frequently violate standard assumptions of rational utility maximising behaviour, which include 
evaluating each choice task independently and responding truthfully based on the complete set of 
information contained in choice tasks in a fully compensatory manner (Colombo and Glenk, 2014), 
while drawing on well-defined preferences that are invariant over the sequence of choice tasks (Day 
and Pinto-Prades, 2010). Consequently, much attention has recently been paid to account for various 
simplifying decision rules and information processing strategies in discrete choice models, and to 
analyse their impact on estimates of willingness to pay (WTP) (Adamowicz et al., 2014).  
Different information processing strategies and simplifying decision rules (heuristics) can be 
understood as a response of boundedly rational individuals, who adapt their response behaviour 
depending on context in choice environments (Payne et al., 1993). In more complex choice situations, 
decision makers increasingly rely on the use of simplifying decision rules, because a full evaluation of 
all choice alternatives becomes increasingly costly for a respondent to process. Respondents therefore 
trade-off the benefits of additional efforts expended on a decision and the associated cognitive costs 
(Heiner, 1983). Beyond the complexity directly associated with the choice tasks per se, heuristics may 
be used if the environmental good itself has characteristics that are not clearly understood by 
respondents or if individuals are unfamiliar with the environmental good (Campbell et al., 2008).  
A range of conjunctive, disjunctive and lexicographic decision rules have been explored in the 
choice modelling literature (Swait, 2001; Hess et al., 2012). Among the information processing 
strategies at the attribute evaluation stage, ‘attribute non-attendance’ has received much attention (for 
example, Campbell et al., 2011; Colombo et al., 2013; Alemu et al., 2013; Glenk et al. 2014). This 
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paper focuses on inconsistencies in respondents’ choices with respect to the cost attribute1, an issue 
which has received little attention in the literature despite potentially having a profound impact on CE 
outcomes. Inconsistent choices violate one or several of the axioms of rational choice behaviour2. The 
following is a typical example of an inconsistent choice with respect to the cost attribute that clearly 
violates the completeness and monotonicity axioms of a rational choice. A respondent declares to be 
willing to pay a maximum amount of € X for a specific environmental improvement. In the CE, 
however, s/he chooses alternatives that are associated with smaller environmental improvements at 
the same or at a larger cost. This may occur as a result of misunderstanding, boredom, fatigue, lack of 
interest, or because, given the hypothetical nature of the choice context, respondents allocate smaller 
importance to the cost associated with the environmental improvements (Cameron and DeShazo, 
2010). Choices that violate axioms of rational choice behaviour may also be related to the elicitation 
method employed. Compared to responses to contingent valuation (CV) questions, responses to CEs 
may be more likely to reflect relative value rather than absolute value and therefore be more likely to 
violate individual budget constraints (Roe et al., 1996; Salensminde, 2003). Also, the experimental 
design may be the cause of choice inconsistencies if some respondents do not perceive the between-
alternative difference in cost large enough to influence their choice, at least for a subset of the choice 
tasks (Puckett and Hensher, 2008). Another potential source of choosing inconsistently with respect to 
cost are anchoring effects resulting in choices that are dependent on cost values shown in preceding 
choice cards (Carlsson and Martinson, 2008; Ladenburg and Olsen, 2008; Mørkbak et al., 2010). 
Finally, inconsistent choices may arise because of psychological constructs, such as ethical positions, 
environmental attitudes and social norms (Jones, 1998), or pro-social behaviour (Stern, 2000), which 
1 Choice inconsistencies may affect any attribute used in the choice cards. We focused on the cost attribute 
acknowledging its central importance in the estimation of the welfare measures. 
2 Individuals are assumed to hold rational preferences if these are complete, transitive, monotonic and 
continuous. Complete preferences mean that individuals know exactly what they prefer; transitive preferences 
mean that if good A if preferred to B and B to C, A is also preferred to C; monotonicity means that ‘at least as 
much of everything is at least as good’, i.e., respondents recognize dominant choices; continuity means that 
individuals are able to compensate the loss of one good by a gain of another (Ryan et al., 2009).  
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drive respondents to choose the ‘policy-on’ alternatives regardless of their cost to avoid further 
environmental losses3. 
For a given respondent, it is difficult to establish the reasons for having chosen inconsistently 
given that the sources of inconsistency are likely to be varied and interconnected. Accordingly, choice 
inconsistencies may impact on both the random error in the choice process (DeShazo and Fermo, 
2002; Fiebig et al., 2010), and on individual systematic utilities (Dellaert et al., 2012). The impact on 
the random term of utility is difficult to predict; individuals who systematically choose inconsistently, 
due to specific environmental attitudes, perceptions or social norms, may be ‘consistently 
inconsistent’ and as such have lower error variances. On the contrary, inconsistent choices which 
originate from preferences that are not well-formed as a consequence of unfamiliarity with the 
environmental good, lack of effort, inattention to the choice task or choice complexity are expected to 
result in greater error variances. The impact of choice inconsistencies on the systematic part of utility 
is clearer. If inconsistent choices related to the cost attribute are present, the marginal utility of 
income will be underestimated and welfare measures will be biased upwards4. As such, independently 
from the causes of choice inconsistencies, the message for policy makers who rely on the benefit 
estimates can be misleading. This paper aims to shed light on the importance of the inconsistent 
choices in CE, in particular on their effect on welfare measures. The specific objectives of this paper 
are threefold: first, to provide a procedure to detect inconsistent choices in CEs. Second, to explore 
the factors that may drive or influence the incidence of inconsistent choices. Third, to offer insights on 
the likely effects that may arise from different ways of treating inconsistent choices on WTP 
estimates. The results of this paper contribute methodologically to the literature by generating a 
procedure that identifies inconsistent choices that can be easily transferred to other studies and 
3 Note that this is different to ‘non-attendance’ to the cost attribute. In the case of inconsistent choices as defined 
in this paper, respondents are fully aware of the cost. Yet, for any reasons including aversion towards 
environmental degradation associated with choosing the status quo alternative, they still choose the alternative 
which provides an environmental improvement. Empirical work directly addressing the issue has found that a 
significant proportion of survey respondents treat the environment in a manner that is inconsistent with 
economic theory (Spash, 2006). 
4 This would not be the case if respondents carried out lexicographic choices with respect to the cost attribute by 
choosing always the cheapest alternative, neglecting all other attributes. This would result in an overestimation 
of the marginal utility of income and downscaled welfare measures.  
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contexts using stated preference methods. As pointed out by Salensminde (2006), analysts should use 
survey designs that collect more signal and less noise, and that can separate signal from noise. This 
requires a thorough investigation of each respondent’s choices. The procedure described in this paper 
provides the analyst with the opportunity to examine challenging choices more thoroughly. Such 
choices tend to occur more frequently in environmental studies, where respondents are often not 
familiar with the goods and services investigated. The paper also contributes to the literature by 
providing evidence on the factors that explain choice inconsistencies. Finally, it provides evidence on 
the magnitude of difference in estimated welfare resulting from different considerations of how 
inconsistent choices should enter the modelling process. To the best of our knowledge, only one study 
that applied this procedure has been published in literature (Rocamora et al., 2014). The current study 
presents several advances over Rocamora et al. (2014): it analyses the factors which affect choice 
inconsistencies; it explicitly considers the random component of utility and the impact of inconsistent 
choices on it; it employs the cutoffs approach in the modelling stage; and finally, it compares 
estimates of open ended CV and CE elicitation formats.  
We identify inconsistent choices with respect to the cost attribute for each respondent using a 
cutoffs approach. Different from previous studies that made use of price cutoffs (Bush et al., 2009 or 
Ding et al., 2010), respondents were given the opportunity to review and revise those choices that are 
found to be inconsistent with their stated price cutoff. This allowed not only resolving the inconsistent 
choices to make them consistent by using assumptions regarding acceptable thresholds of 
inconsistencies (Bush et al., 2009), but also to correct them based on the stated cutoff information 
provided by respondents. 
In what follows, we first describe the design of the questionnaire and the CE (Section 2). 
Section 3 then summarizes the econometric approach employed for data analysis; results are reported 
in Section 4 and subsequently discussed (Section 5), followed by conclusions in Section 6.  
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2. Study design 
The data for this study stems from a choice experiment aimed at investigating the welfare effects of 
implementing organic farming policies in mountainous olive orchards in Andalusia (South of Spain). 
Relative to conventional farming, organic farming in mountainous olive farming systems provides 
several non-market benefits to society that may require governmental support to safeguard their 
supply. In particular, organic farming in olive orchards reduces the carbon footprint of agriculture, 
improves agricultural biodiversity, reduces water pollution and soil erosion and is a source of 
employment and thus contributes to the viability of communities in rural areas. 
The survey was carried out as an on-line questionnaire, a format which is increasing in its 
popularity in stated choice data collection due to, inter alia, reduced cost and faster completion times 
relative to mail, phone, and in-person surveys (Tomsor and Shupp, 2009). On-line questionnaires also 
make use of technological possibilities to provide respondents with a broader set of stimuli in terms of 
images and animated examples, to improve survey flow and to avoid data entry mistakes. As such, the 
on-line format is particularly convenient for valuing environmental goods that respondents are often 
not familiar with and that hence need to be carefully described in the questionnaire. However, on-line 
surveys are typically characterised by important limitations, especially regarding sample coverage and 
representativeness, self-selection bias and survey mode effects (Lindhem and Navrud, 2011a,b). In 
this study, the on-line implementation of the survey was a key aspect of the design of the 
questionnaire given that the lack of familiarity with both the choice experiment task and the issue 
investigated in the study may be sources of choice inconsistency. The environmental and social 
effects of organic farming were introduced to respondents through short and clear pieces of 
information in order to keep their attention. Images and graphical illustrations were accompanied by 
plain language descriptions and explanations, all of which were thoroughly pre-tested in focus groups 
and individual interviews for understanding5. The CE task was carefully explained to respondents, 
who were reminded of the implicit need to trade off the benefits of the ‘policy-on’ alternatives with 
5 Two focus groups and several individual interviews with citizens were carried out before launching the on-line 
survey. Additionally, a pre-test of 30 on-line surveys was performed. 
6 
                                                          
their associated cost. Furthermore, respondents were also offered the possibility of viewing examples 
of completed choice tasks with explanations of the trade-offs involved in choosing. In order to ease 
the comprehension of the attributes and levels, we captured this information in one simple table, 
which was made always available throughout the completion of the choice tasks through a simple 
click.  
Six choice cards were presented to each respondent, who were asked to choose the preferred 
alternative from three alternatives, as shown in Figure 1. The first alternative was held constant across 
choice tasks and described the current situation of olive grown mountain areas according to the 
selected attributes. The remaining two alternatives varied between choice cards. 
Figure 1: Example of a typical choice card  
ABOUT HERE 
Prior to the CE, the interviewees were reminded about their budget constraint and the 
existence of alternative goods they may prefer to consume. In order to encourage respondents to think 
carefully about their budget constraint, we delayed the availability of the following page of the survey 
for thirty seconds, emphasizing the importance of the information shown for carrying out the 
subsequent choice tasks. 
The procedure used to identify and reconsider inconsistent responses directly followed the CE 
exercise. All respondents who chose a ‘policy-on’ alternative at least once were inquired about their 
maximum WTP for the ‘best’ possible scenario according to the attribute levels. This was 
accomplished by showing respondents a choice card, on which we paired the status quo with an 
alternative that was defined by the attribute levels representing the largest environmental and social 
improvements. This alternative was superior in terms of utility to any of the alternatives shown in the 
choice cards, given that none of the alternatives used in the CE incorporated the ‘best’ possible 
scenario according to all non-cost attributes. To ensure that the stated WTP was a close proxy of the 
maximum amount they were willing to pay, respondents were again reminded to consider their budget 
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constraint before asking them to state the maximum amount of money they are willing to pay in 
exchange for the scenario shown. We also emphasized that the stated WTP must be the amount of 
money above which they would not be willing to pay even a single cent more. 
Choices were classified as inconsistent if the maximum WTP stated by respondents for the 
‘best’ scenario was lower than the cost associated with a chosen alternative in the CE exercise. 
Respondents with choice tasks identified to be inconsistent were informed about their inconsistency 
and given the opportunity to reconsider their choices in these tasks (Figure 2). It is important to note 
that we did not prompt them to change their initial choice, but simply asked them to either confirm or 
revise it.  
Figure 2: The iterative procedure to detect choice inconsistencies. 
ABOUT HERE 
Throughout the survey, we recorded information about the time spent by each respondent on 
different sections of the questionnaire. In particular, we observed the total time each respondent 
dedicated to the reading of the information provided, and the time spent on the choice tasks. The panel 
members received a reward for each completed survey. Given this incentive structure, concerns are 
justified that respondents might want to answer the survey as quickly as possible, or complete it 
discontinuously during short breaks to simply receive the reward. In the literature there are no clear 
directional expectations with respect to the overall effect of individual differences in total decision 
time6, which can vary greatly across individuals. However, the presence of extremely short or long 
response times can signal anomalies in carrying out the survey and should therefore alert analysts 
about possible problems with the stated choices. These indicators were used as proxies, together with 
a set of demographic variables, to test whether there is a systematic relationship between time taken to 
6 Longer decision time can either indicate lower cognitive capability, be a signal of greater involvement in the 
choice task (Otter et al., 2008), or be an indicator of a more ‘relaxed’ approach to responding (Bonsall and 
Lythgoe, 2009). Alternatively, longer decision times have been associated with more complex choice tasks 
(Dellaert et al., 2012), and with respondent-specific characteristics (Bonsall and Lythgoe, 2009). 
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read the information provided or to carry out the choice tasks and the incidence of inconsistent 
choices (Vista et al., 2009). We also investigated whether the incidence of inconsistent choices varies 
across the sequence of choices carried out by a respondent, to test whether respondents’ preferences 
evolve throughout the experiment and whether such a ‘learning effect’ has any impact on choice 
consistency. 
In the last part of the questionnaire, we gathered respondents’ socio-economic data and other 
information about their current consumption of organic food. The sample comprised of 201 
respondents, and the survey was administered between December 2012 and February 2013 by a 
specialized market research company. 
The attributes and levels used in the CE are summarized in Table 1. Four attributes are 
expressed in qualitative terms, while the remaining two are quantitative. The set of attributes and 
levels described in Table 1 constitutes a full factorial design with 35 x 6 = 1,458 combinations. By 
means of a fractional factorial design, which allows the estimation of the main effects, the total 
number of combinations was reduced to 36, which were blocked into six groups of six cards. The best 
fraction of the design was determined by minimizing D-error from a set of candidate designs using 
Bayesian techniques in NGENE V.1. (for a general overview of efficient experimental design 
literature see Rose et al. (2011) and references cited therein).  
Table 1: Attributes and levels of the choice experiment   
ABOUT HERE 
3. Methodology  
The frequency of choice inconsistencies in the sample is first analysed descriptively. In a second step 
we investigate possible factors driving inconsistent choices by means of a logistic regression of the 
incidence of inconsistencies as a function of demographic variables and the time required for reading 
the information and executing the CE. In the regression, we use the 10th and 90th percentiles as 
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thresholds for extremely fast and slow reading and completion of the CE. The 10th percentile was 
used, because it approximately matched with the minimum time needed to read the information 
measured in the pre-test of the survey and in the focus groups (380 seconds). The 90th percentile was 
chosen to identify respondents, who took a very long time for responding7.  
Inconsistent choices may also originate from choice task difficulty, especially in the first 
choice tasks, in which respondents may still become more familiar with how to respond to the choice 
questions (Carlsson et al., 2012). We test for this effect by comparing the frequency of inconsistent 
choices across choice occasions using standard t-tests.  
The model chosen for the analysis of the choice data is the Generalized Multinomial Logit 
Model (GMNL) and data analysis was carried out with NLOGIT 5 software. The GMNL model 
allows taking respondents’ taste heterogeneity into account, and permits us to test if the treatment of 
choice inconsistencies affects the variance of the error. The GMNL model nests the scale 
heterogeneity multinomial logit model and the mixed logit model, and is particular suitable to shed 
light on whether the heterogeneity in the choice data is better described by taste heterogeneity, scale 
heterogeneity or a mixture of the two (Fiebig et al., 2010). In this model the utility of respondent n 
from choosing alternative j in choice situation t is given by: 
𝑈𝑛𝑗𝑡 = [𝜎𝑛𝛽 + 𝛾𝜂𝑛 + (1 − 𝛾)𝜎𝑛𝜂𝑛]𝑥𝑛𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑛𝑗𝑡       [1] 
where σn is the scale parameter of person n, β is the vector of mean attribute utility weights, ηn is the 
vector of individual-specific deviations from the mean attribute utility weights, γ is a parameter 
bounded between 0 and 1, which controls how the variance of residual taste heterogeneity varies with 
scale in a model that includes both8, xnjt is the vector of attribute values of alternative j and εnjt is the 
7 In analyses not shown here, we employed different thresholds (5th/95th and 20th/80th percentiles), but results 
did not differ from the ones described in this study. 
8 Fiebig et al. (2010) identified two ways of specifying the GMNL model. GMNL model type I, where the 
individual-specific standard deviation of the attribute utility weights (ηn) is independent of the scaling of β; and 
GMNL model type II, where the ηn is proportional to the scale parameter of an individual (σn). The γ parameter 
reveals whether in a particular dataset the heterogeneity structure is closer to the type I or the type II GMNL 
model. As γ→1, the model approaches to GMNL type I, whilst as γ→0 it approaches to type II. 
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error term assumed to be identically and independently distributed following an extreme value 
distribution. 
Given that σn and β enter in the estimation as a product, a normalization either in σn or in β is 
necessary to identify the parameters. Conventionally, the mean of σn is set to 1 so that β describes the 
mean utility of the attributes. Furthermore, being a scale parameter, σn must be positive. To achieve 
both goals Fiebig et al. (2010) proposed the following transformation:  
𝜎𝑛 = exp (σ + 𝜏𝜀0)     [2] 
where ô is a parameter to be estimated, σ is = -τ2/2 and ε0 is ~N(0,1). Equation [2] allows quantifying 
the individual heterogeneity in the scale parameter, but does not help to explain individual differences 
in scale. Individuals may be ‘consistently inconsistent’ in their choices, for example if their choices 
are driven largely by pro-environmental social norms. This would result in lower error variances. 
However, respondents with preferences that are not well-formed or that expend little effort in 
responding to the choice questions may have greater variances of the error term. To test whether the 
incidence of inconsistent choices results in lower or greater error variance, we specify the scale 
parameter as a function of whether an individual chose inconsistently: 
𝜎𝑛 = exp (σ + 𝜏𝜀0 + 𝛿𝐼)     [3] 
where I is a dummy variable that equals one if an individual has chosen inconsistently, and δ 
is a parameter to be estimated. The analyses of scale heterogeneity as a function of inconsistent choice 
occurrence have been carried out using scaled multinomial logit models, given that the GMNL models 
did not converge when heteroskedasticity is allowed9.  
9 The scaled multinomial logit model is a particular form of the GMNL model which assumes constant 
preference parameters across individuals. As such, choice heterogeneity is modelled by focusing on the scale 
heterogeneity, considering that for some individuals (those with inconsistent choices in our case) the scale of the 
idiosyncratic error term is different from that of other individuals.  
11 
                                                          
The parameters are estimated using a simulated log likelihood procedure with 250 Halton 
draws. The simulated choice probabilities of respondent n to choose alternative j in choice situation t 
are calculated as: 
𝑃(𝑗|𝑥𝑛𝑡) =  1𝐷  ∑ exp (𝜎𝑑𝛽+𝛾𝜂𝑑+(1−𝛾)𝜎𝑑𝜂𝑑)𝑥𝑛𝑗𝑡∑ exp (𝜎𝑑𝛽+𝛾𝜂𝑑+(1−𝛾)𝜎𝑑𝜂𝑑)𝑥𝑛𝑗𝑡𝐽𝑘=1𝐷𝑑=1     [4] 
where d stands for the simulation draws taken from a multivariate normal distribution with mean 0 
and variance-covariance matrix Σ for the η parameters and from a standard normal for ε. 
As in all random parameter models, the random distribution of the coefficients must be 
exogenously specified by the analyst. After testing several alternatives, the final model specification 
assumed individual tastes to follow a normal distribution for the environmental and employment 
attributes, and a constrained triangular distribution for the tax attribute. The reason for choosing a 
constrained triangular distribution for tax was to avoid very long tails in the distribution of the cost 
parameter, while still allowing for heterogeneity in sensitivity to cost. Other model specifications, 
such as the mixed logit model, the latent class model and the covariance heterogeneity model have 
also been tested during the model selection. These models have been dismissed, because they were 
found to be statistically inferior relative to the GMNL10. 
We also added interactions of socio-economic characteristics and attitudinal variables with the 
alternative-specific constant for the status quo alternative and with tax to the specification of the 
indirect utility function. These interactions allowed describing observed variability in choices that is 
not captured via the random taste parameters. In particular, we included interactions between the 
constant and both respondents’ income (K*INC) and their consumption habits regarding organic 
products (K*CONS). Additionally, we added interactions between the respondents’ main reason for 
consuming organic products and the tax attribute11. 
10 An example of the results using a mixed logit model can be found in Rocamora et al. 2014. 
11 Because we are interested in WTP for different policy outcomes resulting from an expansion of organic 
farming, we have to consider respondents as taxpayers, regardless of whether they consume organic products or 
12 
                                                          
Six models were estimated to investigate the impact of choice inconsistencies on WTP. The 
benchmark model (model 1) assumes that there are no inconsistencies in respondents’ choices, as 
typically done in a CE study. In a second model, we use the choice data collected after giving 
respondents the opportunity (but not prompting them) to revise inconsistent choices detected via their 
stated maximum WTP for the ‘best’ possible outcome in terms of environmental and social conditions 
(model 2). The next models (models 3, 4 and 5) form a group in which the choices that remain 
inconsistent after the revision made by respondents are either accepted by the analyst or removed 
from the consideration set. The three models differ in the threshold of exceeding stated WTP that is 
used to accept a choice and thus consider it to be consistent. In model 3 we assume that a choice is 
still inconsistent if, after the revision made by the respondents, the cost of the chosen alternative is 
more than 130 % higher than the stated maximum WTP12. Models 4 and 5 allow violations of the 
maximum WTP between 30 % - 130 % and between 0 % - 30 %, respectively. The cutoff values have 
been chosen to divide the inconsistent choices evenly (33rd and 66th percentiles) into three categories 
of violation according to the distribution of the magnitude of violations. As such, at least qualitatively, 
the resulting categories describe large (>130 %), medium (31 % - 130 %) and small (≤30 %), 
violations of the stated price cutoff. Due to the removal of inconsistent choices, the number of 
observations decreases progressively as the assumptions regarding acceptable violations of the stated 
cutoffs become stricter. In model 6, all inconsistent individuals (not just choices) have been omitted 
from the sample. Finally, to shed light on whether scale differs between individuals depending on 
whether they have made an inconsistent choice or not, we present the results of a scale multinomial 
logit model in which we allow heteroskedasticity in the scale parameter as a function of whether an 
individual chose inconsistently and whether s/he retains the choice after revision. Table 2 summarises 
the main characteristics of all models. 
not. However, previous research (e.g., Hughner et al., 2007; Roddy et al., 1996; Squires et al., 2001; Soler et al., 
2002) indicates that environmental concerns are sometimes a driver for consuming organic products. We 
therefore expected that respondents who declared to consume organic products for environmental reasons show 
a larger WTP. Three interactions were used in the model; the first was between the tax attribute and a dummy 
variable indicating that respondents stated that they consume organic products mainly because they are healthier 
(T*CONS H); the second between the tax attribute and a dummy for the environment as the main stated reason 
for consuming organic products (T*CONS E); the third interaction between tax and a dummy capturing better 
taste as the main reason for consuming organic products (T*CONS OL). 
12 For example, if a respondent declares a maximum WTP of 10 EUR but chooses an alternative with an 
associated cost of 20 EUR, the violation of the stated maximum WTP is 100 % ((20 €-10 €)/10 €).  
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Table 2: Description of the estimated models 
ABOUT HERE 
Theoretically, this approach makes use of the general notion of Swait’s (2001) cutoffs to 
incorporate non-compensatory decision rules into discrete choice models. Cutoffs represent 
respondent-specific attribute level thresholds which, if exceeded or ‘violated’, have implications for 
choice of the affected alternatives. Cutoffs can be viewed by the analyst as ‘hard’ or ‘soft’. When a 
‘hard’ cutoffs perspective is assumed, no violation of cutoffs is allowed (as in models 5 and 6). 
However, empirical research has shown that individuals sometimes violate (consistently) their cutoffs 
(Huber and Klein, 1991; Swait, 2001). Accordingly, there should be a positive probability of choosing 
alternatives that violate cutoffs without considering these choices as inconsistent. The literature refers 
to this as ‘soft’ cutoffs (e.g., Swait, 2001; Bush et al., 2009; Castro et al., 2013)13. To model soft 
cutoffs, in models 3 and 4 we only consider a choice to be inconsistent if the violation relative to the 
price is larger than the assumed price cutoff. 
4. Results 
4.1. Analysis of choice inconsistencies 
The characteristics of the sample relative to Andalusian population statistics are reported in Table 3. 
The sample is representative for Andalusia with respect to gender (chi squared=0.29; p-value=0.99) 
and the distribution of the population amongst the seven Andalusian provinces (chi squared=0.29; p-
value=0.99). However, it is formed by younger (chi squared=64.04; p-value=0.00) and higher 
educated citizens (chi squared=136.63; p-value=0.00) relative to the general population.    
Table 3: Sample features 
13 Swait (2001) and Bush et al. (2009) allowed respondents to violate the stated cutoffs by applying a utility 
penalty to chosen alternatives, which contained unacceptable attribute levels (‘soft’ cutoffs approach). However, 
they did not allow respondents to modify the choices that violated the stated cutoffs. 
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ABOUT HERE 
In the choice experiment, 15 respondents (7.5 % of the sample) were identified as protesters 
based on responses to follow-up questions. Protesters were omitted, resulting in a final sample of 
1,116 observations for model estimation. Choice inconsistencies were revealed by comparing the cost 
of the chosen alternative in the CE with the maximum WTP stated for the ‘best’ possible scenario 
according to the attribute levels. 112 interviewees (56 % of the sample) were detected to be 
inconsistent in at least one of their choices; in particular, among the respondents who made 
inconsistent choices, 63 % are found to have made one or two inconsistent choices, 34 % between 
three and five inconsistent choices, and the remaining 3 % were inconsistent in the whole set of 
choices. This corresponds to a total of 263 inconsistent choices, or 24 % of the total. Regarding 
possible factors that drive inconsistent choices, the results of the logistic regression show that the 
educational level is the only significant explanatory variable in the model (Table 4). In line with 
Salensminde (2002), highly educated respondents have a lower probability of being inconsistent. 
Interestingly, the results indicate that neither the time spent on reading the information provided nor 
on carrying out the choice exercise is related to the incidence of choice inconsistencies.  
Table 4: Binary logistic regression for inconsistencies 
ABOUT HERE 
The analyses regarding the time spent by respondents on each of the choice occasions are 
summarised in Table 5. Results show that on average respondents were increasingly faster in 
completing the choice tasks as they move through the sequence of choice tasks. The decline in 
completion times is particularly pronounced for the first two tasks. The average time spent is almost 
halved for the second task relative to the first, and is further reduced by a third when comparing the 
second and the third choice task. The additional time respondents took in answering the first choice 
questions is likely due to an initially limited understanding on how to best carry out the trade-offs 
between attributes and comparisons across alternatives, given that most respondents never 
experienced this type of survey before, and probably related to identifying choice processing 
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strategies that are optimal to them to be used in the following choices. This result may be attributed to 
an institutional learning effect (Bonsall and Lythgoe, 2009; Carlsson et al., 2012), which reflects how 
people learn to process the information more rapidly as they become more experienced. Previous 
studies in the literature found similar results, for example Haaijer et al. (2000) and Rose and Black 
(2006).  
Along the sequence of choice tasks, the frequency of inconsistent choices varies between 
19 % and 25 %, and is slightly elevated for the first three choices. However, the differences are not 
statistically significant14. This finding is an indication that value learning (i.e., ‘discovering’ 
preferences for a specific change, see Plott, 1996) or strategic learning (i.e., learning about strategic 
opportunities that arise from sequential choice, see for example Scheufele and Bennett, 2012) are 
unlikely to have influenced the incidence of inconsistent choices. Also, it indicates that the design of 
the questionnaire, and in particular the information provided to respondents prior to the first choice 
task, was successful in conveying a clear understanding on how to carry out the choice tasks. 
Table 5: Analysis of response times and incidence of inconsistent choices 
ABOUT HERE 
The number of respondents with inconsistent choices was reduced to 71 (35 % of the sample) 
after providing them with the opportunity to revise their initial choices, which correspond to 155 
inconsistent observations (14 % of the sample). This reveals that, out of the choices that were initially 
detected to be inconsistent (24 % of all choices), 42% have been corrected through the iterative 
procedure and 58% remained inconsistent. Different explanations for the correction or the 
confirmation of inconsistent choices can be offered. Respondents who corrected their inconsistent 
choices may have realised that in the initial choice task they had deliberately chosen the ‘best’ 
alternatives irrespective of cost considerations due to ethical positions, environmental attitudes and 
social norms, or that they have made errors due to little effort expended on choosing or due to general 
14 We tested whether the proportion of inconsistencies was statistically different along the sequence of choices 
by means of a chi-squared test, and found that at the 5 % confidence level, the incidence of inconsistencies does 
not differ across the sequence.  
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disinterest in the choice task. Another possible reason may be the lack of procedural invariance 
between the two elicitation methods employed. The maximum WTP stated in the open ended CV 
question may differ from the maximum WTP arising from choices made based on the comparison of 
the alternatives in the choice cards. Roe et al (1996) and Salensminde (2003) observed that CE, 
compared to open ended CV, tends to capture respondents’ relative valuation rather than their 
absolute valuation, which is more in line with their budget constraints. As such, it should be expected 
that the values obtained from open ended CV would be lower than those derived through CE. 
Irrespective of the underlying reason, once respondents were alerted of the inconsistency in their 
responses, they made a rational decision to either corrected or retained their initial choices. 
One third of the remaining inconsistent choices entail a small violation of the price cutoff 
(lower than 30 %), one third a medium violation (between 31 % and 130 %) and the remaining a large 
violation (>130 %). However, not all of these choices are necessarily revealing a behaviour that is 
inconsistent with (bounded) rational choice of respondents. In line with the soft cutoffs approach 
(Swait, 2001; Bush et al. 2009), there is a positive probability that individuals deliberately violate 
their price cutoffs (maximum WTP), because the disutility of the violation is lower than the disutility 
of choosing the second best option. Another possible reason is that respondents’ preferences are vague 
and affected by a degree of uncertainty or fuzziness. In this case, the maximum WTP should not be 
considered as a fixed amount, but as a distribution with a variance that is proportional to the degree of 
fuzziness or uncertainty. Carson et al. (2012) observed that in this individual choice in a public good 
context can be expected to diverge significantly from what standard utility theory predicts if 
preferences are well defined.  
4.2. The impact of choice inconsistencies on preferences and WTP 
The coefficients of the estimated choice models are displayed in Table 6. The second column reports 
the results of the initial choices (i.e., ignoring any inconsistencies). All attribute coefficients are 
highly significant (1 % level) and with the expected sign, except the intermediate level of soil erosion, 
which is significant at the 5 % level. The standard deviation of the random parameters is also 
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significant for all the attributes, revealing a considerable amount of unobserved preference 
heterogeneity. However, except for the risk of pollution of water resources, preference heterogeneity 
is only present for the attributes’ highest levels of improvement. The significance and negative sign of 
the constant implies preferences towards the status quo alternative for reasons not explained by the 
attributes. The positive sign of the interaction of the constant with a dummy indicating consumption 
of organic products reveals that consumers have a higher probability of choosing policy-on 
alternatives relative to those who declared not to consume organic products. The three interactions 
between dummy variables for stated main reasons for consuming organic products and the tax 
attribute are highly significant. This suggests that there are differences between the marginal disutility 
of income of those taxpayers who are also consumers of organic products and the rest of the sample; 
also, within the group ‘consumers of organic products’, there are significant differences in WTP 
depending on the main reason stated for the consumption of organic products. In particular, all else 
equal, individuals who declared to consume organic products mainly for environmental concerns are 
willing to pay more, an expected result given that the main issue investigated was the environmental 
care through organic policies in olive orchards. The estimate of the τ parameter is positive and 
significantly different from zero, indicating the scale parameter differs between individuals across the 
sample. In particular, the mean and standard error of the estimated parameter reveal that a respondent 
at the 90th percentile of the scale parameter distribution would have his or her vector of utility weights 
scaled up by 15 %, whereas a person at the 10th percentile would have his or her vector of utility 
weights scaled down by 10 %15. The estimate of the gamma parameter is not different from zero. This 
implies, according to the results of Fiebig et al. (2010), that the model approaches the G-MNL-II 
form; i.e., that the variance of the residual taste heterogeneity increases with scale. 
The third column of Table 6 describes the model results including the revised choices of 
respondents. Again, all coefficients are significant at the 1 % level, except for the intermediate level 
of the soil erosion. The model is statistically superior to model 1, gaining 39 units in the log 
likelihood function at convergence. Unexpectedly, the coefficient associated with a medium 
15 These percentages have been calculated by applying equation 2.  
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improvement in biodiversity is larger than the one associated with a large improvement. Despite the 
fact that the difference is not statistically significant, it may reveal that respondents find it difficult to 
discern the differences between the medium and high level of this attribute. The magnitude of the tax 
coefficient is smaller, indicating that the revision of detected inconsistencies reduces the marginal 
utility of income of those respondents not consuming organic products. The coefficient of the 
interaction of the constant with respondents’ income becomes significant in this model, indicating that 
after removing inconsistencies, respondents’ income affects the probability of choosing the policy 
alternatives. Interviewees with lower incomes are more likely to choose the status quo option. Some 
of those respondents initially chose an alternative that exceeded their budget constraint, despite the 
emphasis that the questionnaire placed on taking disposable income and alternative ways to allocate 
the money into account. This could evidence that budget restriction reminders may fail to be effective 
for at least some of the respondents. It may also reveal the presence of hypothetical bias, or simply 
indicate a lack of interest that some members of the on-line panel have in the issue investigated in the 
survey. The interactions with the tax attribute are significant at the 1 % level and show large 
differences between organic consumers and the rest of the sample, and among organic consumers. 
Again, and all else equal, the lowest disutility from paying the tax is associated with those who 
consume organic products for the environmental benefits they create. In this model, the scale 
parameter is also highly significant and of similar magnitude to the one identified in model 1. This 
result reveals that overall the correction of choice inconsistencies does not affect the randomness of 
the choice (variance of the error term). Columns four to six in Table 6 describe the models where 
inconsistent choices are removed according to increasing violations of the price cutoffs. The 
coefficients of the models are very similar to the ones in model 2. Again, all coefficients are 
significant except for soil erosion. The tax coefficients are progressively smaller in magnitude 
compared to model 2 as we move towards tighter conditions on consistency, indicating that 
considering only consistent choices results in a greater disutility among respondents. The interaction 
of the constant with the income level increases to a 1 % significance level in all models revealing that 
the probability of choosing the ‘policy-on’ alternatives is even more strongly related to an individual’s 
income. The interactions between the tax attribute and the reasons of consuming organic products 
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remain highly significant and show larger differences in the sensitivity of organic consumers to an 
increase in tax. The τ parameter in models 3 and 4 is slightly lower than in the other models; however 
the difference is not statistically significant. Model coefficients containing only consistent individuals 
are displayed in column seven of Table 6. Attribute coefficients are similar to the previous models and 
a further decreasing of marginal utility of income is observed. The interaction between the constant 
and income is no longer significant, revealing that the choices of the fully consistent individuals 
between ‘policy-on’ alternatives or the status quo are not dependent on the level of income. 
Interestingly, in this model the τ coefficient is no longer significantly different than zero, revealing 
that the GMNL model reduces to the simpler mixed logit model. This indicates that heterogeneity in 
the choices of the consistent individuals is fully described through the systematic component of 
utility. Overall, consideration, correction or elimination of inconsistencies statistically improves the 
fitting of the models. From model 1 to model 6, the pseudo R squared statistic increases from 0.22 to 
0.35. 
Results of the scale multinomial logit model are displayed in the rightmost column of Table 6. 
The statistical performance of this model is greatly inferior to the GMNL models, indicating that the 
majority of heterogeneity is explained by the variation in the systematic component of utility and 
demonstrating that neglecting taste heterogeneity reduces the capacity of the model to describe the 
respondents’ choices. Interestingly, the negative and highly significant value of the delta parameter 
shows that inconsistent individuals are associated with lower estimates of the scale parameter, i.e. 
have larger error variances, than consistent ones. This is a signal that inconsistent individuals have 
preferences which are not as well-formed as those of consistent individuals.  
Table 6: Model results 
ABOUT HERE 
Implicit prices obtained from the GMNL models are reported in Table 7. They demonstrate a 
positive WTP towards the outlined improvements in all the attributes, except for the intermediate 
level of soil erosion in all models but the first and for both levels of the same attribute in models 5 and 
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6. As expected, the estimates of implicit prices are lower for all attributes once inconsistent choices 
are revised or omitted from the data. This decrease in implicit prices may be as large as 66 %, as for 
the highest level of the tackling climate change attribute and the comparison of model 1 and model 6. 
Except for biodiversity, we also observe a decrease in the WTP difference between moderate and high 
levels of the environmental impacts when moving from model 1 to model 6. In other words, the effect 
of diminishing marginal WTP becomes more pronounced once inconsistent choices are accounted for.   
Table 7: Implicit prices 
ABOUT HERE 
To test whether there are statistical significant differences between implicit price estimates 
across the six models, we conducted the Poe et al. (2005) test. In Table 8, for sake of space, we show 
results of the comparison between implicit prices of models 1, 2, 4 and 6, given that the results from 
models 3 and 5 mirror the ones of models 2 and 5. Results indicate that accounting for inconsistent 
choices has a significant impact on the implicit prices obtained from CEs. Implicit price estimates of 
model 1 are significantly lower at the 5 % level compared to all other models, with the exception of 
the lowest level of some attributes in the comparison with model 2. The significance of the differences 
increases if we compare estimates of model 1 to the models where inconsistencies have been 
removed. The additional treatment of inconsistent choices following respondents’ own revision does 
not have a major effect on distributions of marginal WTP, as indicated by the absence of significant 
differences between implicit prices estimated from model 2 and model 4, and model 2 and model 6. 
The main result is that, once respondents are allowed to reconsider and eventually correct their 
inconsistent choices, the resulting welfare measures are no longer different relative to a model 
estimated from fully consistent individuals. 
Table 8: Comparison of implicit prices using a Poe et al. (2005) test 
ABOUT HERE 
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As a convergence validity test, the average WTP resulting from the ‘best’ scenario can be compared 
with the compensating surplus (CS) estimated using the results of the three CE models by applying 
the conventional formula of Hanemann (1984):  
𝐶𝑆 =  − 1
𝛼
 [𝑙𝑛 ∑ exp𝑉𝑛1 − 𝑙𝑛∑ exp 𝑉𝑛0𝑛𝑛 ]      [5]  
where CS is the compensating surplus welfare measure, α is the marginal utility of income 
and Vn0 and Vn1 represent the nth individuals’ indirect utility functions before and after the change 
under consideration. The comparison is shown in Table 9.  
Table 9: Compensating surplus comparison 
ABOUT HERE 
The average WTP resulting from the respondents’ valuation of the ‘best’ possible scenario 
was 27.34 € (standard deviation=17.91). 4.5 % of the sample expressed a WTP greater than 60 €/year 
and 2.5 % stated a WTP of zero. We assumed a value of 65 €16 for the 4.5 % of the sample who 
expressed a WTP greater than 60 €/year, and 0 €/year for the 2.5 % of respondents who declared a 
genuine zero WTP. In the CE, estimated compensating surplus for the change from the status quo to 
the assumed scenario of maximum improvements in all attributes decreases progressively as we 
impose stricter conditions for considering a choice as consistent. CS estimates based on model 1 are 
significantly greater than mean maximum WTP derived from the stated WTP question. In the case of 
all others models, we find no significant differences between CS estimates. This reveals that once we 
removed inconsistent choices, the elicitation procedure employed does not impact significantly on the 
estimated change in welfare. This suggests that differences in the welfare estimates between open 
ended CV and CE are likely to be caused by the presence of choice inconsistencies in the CE instead 
of different valuations generated by the two elicitation methods.  
16 To test the sensitivity of the results to this assumption, we also used alternative values of 80 € and 100 €. 
Results did not differ significantly from the reported one. 
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5. Discussion 
This study investigated the impact of choice inconsistencies in CEs using data from an on-line survey 
on preferences towards the environmental and social impacts of organic olive farming in mountainous 
areas of Andalusia, South of Spain. The sample of Andalusian citizens was younger and more 
educated relative to the general population, and therefore results have to be treated with caution if the 
reader wishes to use WTP estimates for policy purposes. The difficulty in approaching older and 
lower educated people also reveals that the internet is still not equally accessible to all parts of the 
general population in the studied region. 
More than half of the respondents made at least one inconsistent choice, in that they selected 
an alternative whose associated cost was greater than the maximum WTP stated for the ‘best’ possible 
alternative. The large proportion of choice inconsistencies found in this study is particularly worrying 
given that the sample comprises respondents, who on average are more educated relative to the 
general population, and because efforts have been made in reminding respondents about the 
individual budget restrictions as well as the existence of other substitute goods and services 
respondents may prefer to buy. Indeed, respondents with higher education were less likely to choose 
alternatives that violate their self-stated maximum WTP and needed less time to read the information 
package and to complete the choice tasks. Therefore, differences in response times and incidence of 
inconsistent choices in our study appear to be related to the cognitive capability of respondents 
indicated by their level of educational attainment. This casts doubts on the capability of the general 
population to process the information provided in a way that results in consistent choices, and as a 
consequence questions the policy relevance of the results.. 
The large percentage of inconsistent choice is particularly worrying also because there is no 
corroborative evidence that this result comes from respondents disengaged with the issue investigated 
and the choice task. Using time to read and complete the choice tasks as a proxy for survey 
engagement, we find that only a small proportion of respondents appeared to have taken either very 
little time, or were disproportionally slow to complete the survey. Additionally, the fact that 
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respondents took longer to respond to the first and second choice task compared to subsequent ones 
reveals that they took the choice task seriously. Because the frequencies of choice inconsistencies do 
not vary along the sequence of choice tasks, we are confident in attributing these longer response 
times for the initial tasks to an institutional learning effect. 
Overall, the results of this study question, whether reminding respondents of budgetary 
restrictions and substitutes to the good and services evaluated is effective to improve the quality of the 
estimates obtained in CEs. According to our results, the simple budget and substitute reminders are 
not sufficient to avoid that respondents choose alternatives in the CE with a cost exceeding their 
stated maximum WTP. This result is in line with previous research on attribute processing strategies, 
which found that non-attendance to the cost attribute can be very large (Campbell et al., 2008; Scarpa 
et al., 2009). As pointed out by Scarpa et al. (2009), more research is required to identify 
supplementary questions that provide the analyst with an opportunity to test choice processes and 
outcomes based on information that is individual-specific. The iterative procedure proposed in this 
study contributes to this line of research. The use of ‘cheap talk scripts’17 may be another approach 
worth investigating. In this context, Tonsor and Shupp (2011) found that the use of cheap talk scripts 
can influence WTP estimates derived from on-line surveys and produce more reliable WTP estimates.  
Choice inconsistencies may be due to several causes, each deserving further investigation. 
First, respondents may be reluctant to choose the ‘policy-off’ or status quo alternative if the proposed 
policies concern sensitive topics as is often the case in environmental valuation. Within this context, 
contributions from social psychology in CV surveys reveal that psychological factors can be superior 
to standard socio-economic variables in understanding the motives behind the choices (Spash et al., 
2009). Choice inconsistencies may also arise because the information gathered through on-line 
surveys and in repeated choice situations in relation to public goods and policies is not fully incentive-
compatible given that it lacks a plausible mechanism for consequentiality. More research is required 
17 Cheap talk scripts inform respondents that in similar studies using stated preference methods, people have a 
tendency to overestimate how much they are willing to pay compared to their actual (true) willingness to pay. 
Cheap talk scripts were initially implemented by Cummings and Taylor (1999) in an attempt to reduce 
hypothetical bias in CV. 
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to determine the exact impact of this effect in environmental contexts. Alternatively, respondents may 
deliberately violate their self-reported cutoffs in certain circumstances in line with the ‘soft’ cutoffs 
approach described by Swait (2001). For example, a respondent may retain the most expensive 
alternative as his/her preferred choice despite violating his/her price cutoff, because the second best 
alternative is offering clearly inferior overall trade-offs between costs and benefits. This may also 
occur when respondents’ preferences towards the price cutoffs are vague or uncertain (Carlsson et al., 
2012). In this case, their true maximum WTP lies in an interval of values which respondents are 
definitely willing to pay and definitely not willing to pay and cannot be summarised by a fixed 
amount as shown on choice cards. In this context, Olsen et al. (2011) observed that the utility 
difference has a clear impact on the probability of respondents reporting ex post that they are certain 
or very certain of their choice. The larger the utility difference between the alternative chosen and the 
best of the remaining alternatives, the more likely it is that respondents are confident about their 
choice. The incidence of choice inconsistencies may also be related to the elicitation format used. The 
comparison of two or three alternatives in the CE may lead to a relative valuation of the good by 
respondents, which clearly depends on the subset of alternatives evaluated in each of the choice cards 
and may differ from an absolute value expressed in an open ended CV question. Finally, having to go 
through an iterative procedure that implies repeatedly answering to choice tasks may give rise to 
decision fatigue; not revising their initially inconsistent choice is then a strategy that demands little 
cognitive effort.   
The approach to identifying inconsistent choices and considering them in the choice model 
simultaneously tackles several important problems related to treating inconsistent choices in CE data. 
First, it avoids that inconsistent observations are being ignored, which would bias results. Second, it 
enables the revision of the initially inconsistent choices and therefore avoids a considerable loss of 
information had these choices been omitted. Third, it allows the analyst to identify the factors that 
explain choice inconsistencies giving the possibility, at the study design stage, to reduce the impact of 
these inconsistencies on results. For instance, if the analyst is interested in gathering information that 
is representative of the general population and uses only consistent responses at the same time, s/he 
25 
should oversample those part of the population which are more likely to be inconsistent (less educated 
people in this case study). Fourth, it does not require the analyst to make assumptions about which of 
the choices are actually considered as inconsistent (Bush et al., 2009). Finally, it does not require 
knowledge on the causes of inconsistency, which may be very diverse and heterogeneous across the 
sample.   
Focusing on the CE model results, the revision of inconsistent choices and an additional 
subsequent omission of the residual inconsistencies significantly affect WTP measures. On average 
across all attributes, WTP is higher by 78 % if inconsistencies are ignored (model 1) relative to WTP 
estimates derived from the model that is based on revised choices (model 2). The upward bias of WTP 
estimates based on model 1 increases further as assumptions on whether a choice is being considered 
as consistent become stricter. For example, if the analyst accepts a 30 % deviation between the 
maximum stated WTP and the cost of the chosen alternative in the CE, the bias increases to 133 % 
(model 4). If all remaining inconsistent choices or individuals are omitted, the marginal WTP is 
146 % (model 5) and 199 % (model 6) of the average values based on model 1. These results clearly 
point to the importance of identifying and testing the impact of inconsistent choices in CEs.  
For policy purposes, the dual character of citizens, who can act as consumers and/or 
taxpayers, should be also taken into account when determining WTP. Although the sample is not 
representative of the Andalusian population, it is ‘representative’ of consumers of organic products, 
which on average are more educated and younger than the general population (Briz and Ward, 2009). 
Results indicate that consumers of organic products have larger WTP for an environmental program 
that results in an expansion of organic farming. Amongst consumers of organic products, the largest 
increase in WTP is observed for those respondents, who state to consume organic products mainly for 
environmental reasons, followed by lower increases in WTP for respondents stating health and 
organoleptic reasons as main drivers of choosing organic products. 
Several limitations apply to this study. First, choice task complexity (as defined by observable 
dimensions of choice tasks such as number of alternatives, attributes and attribute levels) was not 
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varied. Choice task complexity has been observed to impact both on the systematic and the random 
component of utility (Dellaert et al., 2012), and may have a significant effect on the incidence of 
choice inconsistencies. Second, choice inconsistencies may be related to any attribute used in the 
choice set, whilst in this study we only focus on the cost attribute. Third, we obtained information on 
the maximum WTP for the ‘best’ scenario by means of a direct question and used it for detecting the 
choice inconsistencies after the completion of the CE. The tax values shown on preceding choice 
cards may have influenced the stated maximum WTP by respondents and the elicitation format 
employed may have impacted the stated WTP. In addition, we implicitly assumed that this value 
represents the true maximum WTP without having given respondents the opportunity to reconsider it 
and without measuring the respondents’ certainty in the response.  
The use of information on revised choices made by respondents may introduce endogeneity 
bias in the coefficients of the models estimated with the revised responses. The respondents’ valuation 
of maximum WTP may change over time as consumers accumulate information about their choice 
tasks or when the decision environment changes (Swait, 2001). Therefore, the assumption of 
exogeneity of information on self-reported cutoffs may not always be warranted18. However, model 5 
and model 6 are not affected by this potential bias, given that they are estimated from a reduced 
sample where no information about the respondents’ maximum WTP is included in the model. The 
lack of significant differences between the welfare estimates of the models where we included 
information on self-reported cutoffs (model 2, 3, and 4) and models 5 and 6 reveals that, if 
endogeneity bias exists in this dataset, its impact is not significant. The determination of the exact 
magnitude of this bias on welfare estimates depending on different ways of using respondent self-
reported information remains an interesting area of future research.  
18 A common approach to overcoming the problem of endogeneity is to use instrumental variables in model 
estimation. However, it may be very challenging to find suitable instrumental variables for self-reported price 
cutoffs. An example of this approach is Ding et al. (2012).  
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6. Conclusions 
We report findings from a study using an on-line format to determine the impact of inconsistent 
choices on welfare estimates derived from CEs. More than half of the sample carried out at least one 
inconsistent choice that is at odds with the self-reported maximum WTP for the ‘best’ possible 
outcome. These inconsistencies were not found to be related to the respondents’ response times 
needed for processing and completing the survey, which was used as a proxy for respondents 
engagement with the issue investigated. Importantly, when faced with the responses identified to be 
inconsistent, a considerable proportion of the sample chose to retain their initial choice. The results 
provide clear evidence on the necessity to consider appropriate supplementary information in on-line 
CEs that can be used to identify inconsistencies at an individual level, in order to increase realism and 
accuracy of the conclusions deduced from CEs used for environmental valuation. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Attributes and levels of the choice experiment 
Attribute Levels Label 
Tackling climate 
change 
Low CC1 
Medium CC2 
High CC3 
Biodiversity Low BD1 
Medium BD2 
High BD3 
Risk of pollution of 
water resources 
High WP1 
Moderate WP2 
Low WP3 
Soil erosion High SE1 
Moderate SE2 
Low SE3 
Agricultural 
employment 
0 %, 5 %, 10 % 
increase 
AE 
Tax 0, 2, 7, 14, 23, 35, 51 
€/year 
T 
Note: Levels of the current situation are shown in bold; the labels indicate the codes used in the model. 
 
Table 2: Description of the estimated models 
 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 GMNL SMNL 
Treatment No 
treatment 
Corrected  
as 
stated 
Inconsistent choices are 
removed if the violation 
relative to the stated 
maximum WTP is larger 
than X % of the maximum 
stated WTP 
All 
inconsistent 
individuals 
removed 
Allows 
heteroskedasticity 
in the scale 
parameter as a 
function of 
inconsistent 
individuals  
 X>130 
% 
X>30
% 
X>0
% 
 
Observations 1116 1116 1067 1004 961 690 1116 
 
 
 Table 3: Sample statistics 
Variables  Values  Sample data 
(%) 
Population data 
(%) 
Gender 1= Female 48.3 50.9 
Educational level 1=None or primary 
studies 
8.5 23,6 
 2= Secondary studies 30.3 50.9 
 3= High degree studies 61.2 25.5 
Age 1= 18-34 years old 51.2 31.0 
 2= 35-65 years old 48.8 51.5 
 3= More than 65 years old 0.0 17.5 
Consumer of organic products 
(CONS) 
1= consumer of organic 
products 
69.2 43.2 
Reasons for consuming organic, % 
of consumers.  
  
 
health (CONS H)  36.0  
environment (CONS E) 32.4  
organoleptic (CONS OL) 21.6  
Other reasons  10.1  
Income in €/month 
(INC) 
Lower than 600  7.5 40.5 
 Between 600 and 1,000  16.4 39.2 
 Higher than 1,000  76.1 20.3 
 
 Table 4: Binary logistic regression for inconsistencies 
Variables Coefficients St. errors P-values 
Constant 0.619 0.652 0.342 
Education -0.668 0.311 0.032 
Gender 0.048 0.305 0.876 
Age -0.009 0.016 0.575 
Consumers of organic products 0.444 0.332 0.181 
Time CE 10th percentile -0.102 0.497 0.838 
Time CE 90th percentile 0.004 0.490 0.994 
Time Reading 10th percentile -0.033 0.499 0.948 
Time Reading 90th percentile 0.250 0.500 0.616 
 
Table 5: Analysis of response times and incidence of inconsistent choices 
 Average 
response time 
(seconds) 
Standard 
deviation 
Inconsistent 
Choices (%) 
T-testa  
Choice Task 1 70.02 32.47 23.4  
Choice Task 2 39.16 25.04 24.9 T1-2=10.24 
Choice Task 3 26.93 16.25 23.9 T2-3=5.63 
Choice Task 4 23.41 13.06 19.4 T3-4= 2.37 
Choice Task 5 23.34 15.73 19.9 T4-5= 0.06 
Choice Task 6 20.67 10.12 19.4 T5-6= 2.10 
a Between time choice task n-1, and time choice task n 

Table 6: Model results 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Attribute Betas St. error Betas St. error Betas St. error Betas St. error Betas St. error Betas St. error Betas St. error 
Random parameters in utility functions 
CC 2 0,961***  0,197 0,905*** 0,219 0,989*** 0,253 0,859*** 0,245 1,064*** 0,344 1,066*** 0,340 1.272*** 0.439 
CC 3 1,254***  0,294 1,000*** 0,267 0,925*** 0,286 0,825*** 0,285 1,103*** 0,391 1,301*** 0,456 1.313*** 0.435 
BD 2 1,208***  0,230 1,375*** 0,266 1,349*** 0,302 1,274*** 0,279 1,509*** 0,368 1,362*** 0,397 1.405*** 0.532 
BD 3 1,367***  0,255 1,263*** 0,277 1,283*** 0,279 1,023*** 0,269 1,181*** 0,359 1,303*** 0,338 1.863*** 0.611 
WP 2 1,040***  0,224 1,318*** 0,273 1,335*** 0,286 1,255*** 0,256 1,538*** 0,411 1,408*** 0,386 1.431*** 0.523 
WP 3 1,632***  0,254 1,928*** 0,352 2,015*** 0,372 1,823*** 0,319 2,008*** 0,474 1,862*** 0,461 2.309*** 0.768 
SE 2 0,506**  0,209 0,255 0,214 0,169 0,258 0,016 0,238 -0,281 0,303 0,260 0,333 0.951** 0.420 
SE 3 0,916***  0,223 0,630*** 0,209 0,569** 0,240 0,456** 0,214 0,366 0,278 0,509 0,336 1.464*** 0.546 
AE 0,251***  0,040 0,224*** 0,040 0,233*** 0,043 0,227*** 0,044 0,269*** 0,063 0,269*** 0,058 0.251*** 0.087 
T -0,150***  0,021 -0,249*** 0,035 -0,260*** 0,038 -0,292*** 0,044 -0,329*** 0,068 -0,354*** 0,065 -0.065*** 0.023 
Nonrandom parameters in utility functions 
Constant (K) -2,108***  0,443 -1,940*** 0,411 -2,152*** 0,466 -1,927*** 0,423 -2,079*** 0,492 -2,244*** 0,657 -2.251*** 0.853 
K*CONS 0,541**  0,272 0,450* 0,269 0,584* 0,299 0,548* 0,288 0,703** 0,318 0,576 0,397   
K*INC 0,093  0,091 0,188** 0,073 0,221*** 0,082 0,228*** 0,077 0,230*** 0,085 0,182* 0,108   
T*CONS H 0,063***  0,014 0,105*** 0,023 0,097*** 0,027 0,102*** 0,030 0,077** 0,032 0,098** 0,046   
T*CONS E 0,087***  0,016 0,130*** 0,025 0,150*** 0,029 0,158*** 0,032 0,146*** 0,034 0,196*** 0,049   
T*CONS OL 0,049***  0,014 0,073*** 0,023 0,079*** 0,025 0,088*** 0,032 0,084** 0,034 0,042 0,049   
Standard deviations of random parameters 
CC 2 0,188  0,591 0,590 0,445 0,758 0,534 0,663 0,604 0,908 0,575 0,935 0,576   
CC 3 1,390*** 0,309 1,365*** 0,385 1,443*** 0,410 1,702*** 0,459 1,858*** 0,586 1,225*** 0,466   
BD 2 0,517  0,519 0,434 0,541 0,916* 0,539 0,645 0,591 0,378 0,834 0,233 1,050   
BD 3 0,870**  0,349 1,272*** 0,385 1,230*** 0,404 1,030** 0,412 1,499*** 0,494 1,058* 0,606   
WP 2 0,847***  0,325 0,401 0,406 0,665 0,453 0,560 0,355 0,881** 0,416 0,798* 0,470   
WP 3 1,248***  0,319 1,419*** 0,351 1,556*** 0,395 1,084** 0,454 1,457*** 0,526 1,639*** 0,521   
SE 2 0,348  0,488 0,624 0,394 1,127*** 0,374 0,924** 0,435 1,047* 0,542 0,802 0,548   
SE 3 0,870***  0,337 0,569 0,395 0,908** 0,433 0,238 0,685 0,867 0,590 1,082* 0,596   
AE 0,165***  0,041 0,213*** 0,042 0,205*** 0,044 0,200*** 0,047 0,190*** 0,056 0,234*** 0,054   
T 0,150***  0,021 0,249*** 0,035 0,260*** 0,038 0,292*** 0,044 0,329*** 0,068 0,354*** 0,065   
Variance parameter tau in GMX scale parameter 
Tau scale 0,422*** 0,114 0,413*** 0,149 0,348** 0,143 0,352** 0,144 0,424** 0,195 0,220 0,223 2.167*** 0.323 
Heterogeneity in the scale parameter 
 -0.719*** 0.189 
Weighting parameter gamma in GMX model 
Gamma 0,000 0,372 0,000 0,334 0,000 0,369 0,000 0,397 0,000 0,457 0,000 0,539 Fixed parameter 
Model features 
LL -951,38 -912,48 -860,45 -791,05 -743,71 -507,29  
R^2 0,22 0,26 0,27 0,28 0,30 0,33  
N 1116 1116 1067 1004 961 690 1116 
 
Table 7: Implicit prices 
 
 Implicit prices Model 
1 
Implicit prices Model 
2 
Implicit prices Model 
3 
Implicit prices Model 
4 
Implicit prices Model 
5 
Implicit prices Model 
6 
Attribute Value Confidence 
interval 
Value Confidence 
interval 
Value Confidence 
interval 
Value Confidence 
interval 
Value Confidence 
interval 
Value Confidence 
interval 
CC 2 9.7 (6.08; 15.94) 5.3 (3.25; 8.54) 5.5 (3.18; 9.00) 4.4 (2.21; 7.46) 4.4 (1.96; 7.16) 3.4 (1.86; 7.04) 
CC 3 12.4 (8.00;19.27) 5.7 (3.07; 9.53) 5.2 (2.46; 8.95) 4.1 (1.58; 7.29) 4.6 (1.84; 8.12) 4.2 (1.93; 9.01) 
BD 2 12.1 (8.29; 19.33) 8.0 (5.73; 12.60) 7.8 (4.98; 13.13) 6.4 (3.93; 10.14) 6.4 (3.65; 10.57) 4.5 (2.39; 9.48) 
BD 3 13.8 (9.59; 21.37) 7.3 (4.83; 11.86) 7.3 (4.76; 12.55) 5.1 (2.73; 8.08) 5.0 (2.44; 8.35) 4.3 (2.45; 9.18) 
WP 2 10.3 (6.99; 16.20) 7.5 (5.48; 10.93) 7.5 (5.33; 11.93) 6.4 (4.36; 9.46) 6.5 (4.24; 8.98) 4.6 (3.03; 8.47) 
WP 3 16.3 (12.23; 24.86) 11.1 (8.67; 16.26) 11.5 (8.85; 17.60) 9.2 (6.88; 13.14) 8.5 (5.95; 11.98) 6.2 (4.67; 11.34) 
SE 2 5.2 (1.15; 10.75) 1.5 (-1.00; 4.62) 1.1 (-1.88; 4.95) 0.1 (-2.22; 2.81) -1.0 (-3.20; 1.62) 0.9 (-1.49; 4.46) 
SE 3 9.1 (5.44; 15.54) 3.7 (1.40; 7.23) 3.2 (0.66; 6.92) 2.3 (0.35; 5.18) 1.6 (-0.89; 4.17) 1.6 (-0.73; 5.05) 
AE 2.5 (1.92; 3.58) 1.3 (0.99; 1.97) 1.3 (1.01; 1.96) 1.2 (0.82; 1.69) 1.1 (0.78; 1.52) 0.9 (0.68; 1.65) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Comparison of implicit prices using a Poe et al. (2005) test 
 Model 1 versus Model 2 versus Model 4 versus 
 Model 2 Model 4 Model 6 Model 4 Model 6 Model 6 
CC 2 ** *** *** NS NS NS 
CC 3 *** *** *** NS NS NS 
BD 2 NS ** *** NS NS NS 
BD 3 ** *** *** NS NS NS 
WP 2 NS ** *** NS NS NS 
WP 3 ** *** *** NS NS NS 
SE 2 NS ** ** NS NS NS 
SE 3 ** *** *** NS NS NS 
AE *** *** *** NS NS NS 
 
 
 
 Table 9: Compensating surplus comparison 
 
 Stated 
WTP 
CE 
MODEL 
1 
MODEL 
2 
MODEL 
3 
MODEL 
4 
MODEL 
5 
MODEL 
6 
Compensating 
Surplus (€) 
(confidence 
interval) 
27.34 
(23.40; 
31.28) 
51.61 
(41.08; 
62.14) 
28.04 
(22.24; 
33.84) 
26.11 
(20.28; 
31.94) 
20.47 
(15.34; 
25.60) 
19.89 
(15.04; 
24.74) 
19.40 
(13.62; 
25.17) 
 
Figures 
 
Figure 1: Example of a typical choice card 
 
 Figure 2: The iterative procedure to detect choice inconsistencies. 
 
The maximum willingness to pay you just declared is at odds with at least 
one of your previous choices.  
That is: previously, you have chosen at least one alternative with an 
associated cost higher than the one you have declared now for the best 
situation. Therefore, we are going to show you again your inconsistent 
choices and we ask you to reconsider them taking into account your 
maximum willingness to pay for the best possible situation. 
Your maximum willingness to pay is inconsistent with your 
previous choices 
Max WTP is consistent with CE choices. The respondent 
follows with the next section of the questionnaire 
